Abstract:
century. In addition, Davidson provides Keynes-inspired critiques of conventional theories of international trade based on comparative advantage and the traditional argument for flexible exchange rates as a means of curing global trade imbalances.
In the remainder of this article, I will first highlight a number of areas in which I think
Davidson is absolutely right in his assessment of the direction in which post-Keynesian analysis of the international economy should proceed. Then, I will turn to two areas in which I would take issue with parts of Davidson's arguments: first, his characterization of what the mainstream of the economics profession believes today; and second, his unduly negative assessment of the potential contribution of exchange rate realignment to rectifying global payments imbalances. In both of these areas, I will suggest reformulations of Davidson's arguments that I think are more defensible. Finally, I will conclude by agreeing with Davidson's fundamental conclusion that we could do better than relying on flexible exchange rates to solve global trade imbalances, while also noting one surprising omission from Davidson's discussion.
Contractionary biases and Keynesian remedies
Davidson ably documents Keynes's constant concern with the potential for liberalized financial flows (or, what used to be known as "capital mobility") to undermine the expansionary macroeconomic policies that he saw as the cure for the Great Depression and the guarantor of postwar prosperity. Because "free movement of capital funds across national boundaries" leads to "a tendency to equalize interest rates across nations," Davidson writes, a country with liberalized financial flows "cannot unilaterally try to reduce its interest rate to stimulate investment and employment" (2007, p. 119) . However, Keynes believed that control of a country's interest rate by its own monetary authority was an indispensable component of a full employment policy:
It is the policy of an autonomous rate of interest, unimpeded by international preoccupations, and of a national investment programme directed to an optimum level of employment which is twice blessed in the sense that it helps ourselves and our neighbours at the same time. (Keynes, 1936 , p. 349, quoted in Davidson, 2007 Therefore, as Davidson notes, Keynes thought it desirable that countries should regulate financial inflows and outflows, i.e., to use what are commonly known as "capital controls."
Keynes also pointed out that, if countries are unable to lower their own interest rates in order to promote full employment, they will be tempted to pursue full employment instead via mercantilist policies aimed at securing a trade surplus. Such a policy approach, however, can lead to what he called a "senseless international competition for favourable [trade] balance which injures all alike" (Keynes, 1936 , pp. 338-39, quoted in Davidson, 2007 . Or, in Joan
Robinson's famous reiteration of Adam Smith, a policy that seeks to achieve high employment via a trade surplus in one country at the expense of low employment and a trade deficit in other countries is a form of "beggar-my-neighbour" trade policy (Robinson, 1947, pp. 156-70) . 1 Thus, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Keynes believed that a world of open capital markets was likely to be a world riven by international conflict over employment opportunities, not a harmonious world with full employment for all nations.
Furthermore, Keynes highlighted the fact that the international monetary system of his time contained a significant contractionary bias in the way that it imposed the burden of adjustment on the countries with balance-of-payments deficits. Whereas a surplus country can sustain its surplus by accumulating gold or foreign exchange reserves almost without limit, as long as it can sterilize the possible inflationary effects, a deficit country will eventually run out of international reserves and hence can be forced to adjust-more rapidly, if the country is subject to a financial crisis (e.g., as a result of capital flight by domestic residents, a speculative attack on its currency, and/or a default on its international debt). In Keynes's own words,
It is characteristic of a freely convertible international standard that it throws the main burden of adjustment on the country which is in the debtor position on the international balance of payments -that is, on the country which is (in this context) by hypothesis the weaker and above all the smaller in comparison with the other side of the scale which (for this purpose) is the rest of the world. (Keynes, 1941 , p. 27, quoted in Davidson, 2007 italics in original.) If a deficit country has to reduce its payments imbalance through its own adjustments, it is forced to take measures such as fiscal cut-backs (spending reductions or tax increases), interest rate hikes (to attract foreign capital, if financial markets are open), and currency depreciation or wage reductions-all of which can have contractionary effects on the domestic economy.
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Moreover, if the country is large enough to have an appreciable impact on its trading partners (and deficit countries need not be small, as the United States has recently demonstrated), the impact of these policies can help to drag down the rest of the global economy. Especially, if one nation's devaluation leads to competitive devaluations by other countries, the result is a situation in which no one gains.
To remedy this bias in the operation of the international monetary system, according to Davidson (2007, pp. 148-49 , italics in original),
Keynes concluded that an essential improvement in designing any international payments system requires transferring the onus of adjustment from the debtor to the creditor position. This transfer would substitute an expansionist, in place of a contractionist, pressure on world trade (Keynes, 1941, pp. 29-30) ....
[Therefore] Keynes recommended combining a fixed, but adjustable, exchange rate system with a mechanism for requiring the nation "enjoying" a favorable balance of trade to initiate most of the effort necessary to eliminate this balance, while "maintaining enough discipline in the debtor countries to prevent them from exploiting the new ease allowed them" (Keynes, 1941, p. 30 (foreign exchange reserves) by the surplus countries, and which would instead encourage those countries to "spend any excessive trade surplus earnings by buying producibles from deficit nations, thereby permitting the deficit nations to work their way out of debt" (Davidson, 2007, p. 123) . To this end, Keynes famously proposed his International Clearing Bank (ICB), a supranational central bank that would emit a new international reserve asset known as the "bancor" and could utilize the excess bancor deposits of creditor countries to provide liquidity to debtor countries.
As is well known, the international monetary system that emerged at the 1944 Bretton (Davidson, 2007, p. 155) . The balances could be spent either on imports of goods and services, foreign direct investment (FDI), or unilateral foreign aid (transfers).
Davidson's vision is that such a mechanism-and the penalty of having excessive credit balances confiscated by the clearing union if not spent-would effectively shift the burden of international adjustment onto surplus nations, thereby imparting an expansionary rather than a contractionary thrust to the global economy.
Although Davidson considers his plan less ambitious than Keynes's original plan (largely because the clearing union falls short of being a true global central bank, as most central banking functions are left to national monetary authorities), nevertheless any plan for creating a new supranational institution with significant power over national governments is still too ambitious to be considered politically realistic in the present situation. The virtue of this proposal, therefore, lies less in the prospect of its adoption in the foreseeable future, than in putting front and center the key idea of inducing the surplus nations to take up more of the burden of adjustment in the international payments system. Minimally, one might hope that the major nations (for example, the G-8 plus China, India, and other large developing nations) might be able to negotiate a cooperative framework in which stimulus policies by the surplus nations would help to maintain global prosperity as the United States and other deficit nations try to adjust their way out of debt. Sadly, it could take a global economic crisis of a magnitude not seen since the 1930s to make something like Davidson's scheme politically feasible.
Absolute versus comparative advantage
Keynes's views on international trade theory were less well formed than his views on international financial arrangements. Therefore, Davidson extrapolates considerably from that it can produce with the relatively lowest opportunity cost. The model of comparative advantage assumes that countries have inherent differences in their "production possibilities" due to inherent differences in their "resource endowments," technological capabilities, or both. This assumption is essential for the implication that every country is better off exploiting its given advantages rather than trying to improve its productive powers. do not have a true comparative (i.e., efficiency) advantage, but instead are exporting based on absolute cost advantages-and, correspondingly, deficit countries are importing some goods in which they actually do have a true comparative advantage, but lack an absolute cost advantage at the prevailing wages, prices, and exchange rates (see Blecker, 2005a) . Second, post-Keynesians have long criticized the assumptions of immobile capital and given technological capabilities that are essential for trade to follow comparative advantages. 4 In a world of mobile capital and technology, it is evident that most of the competitive advantages in modern international trade are created, not "endowed." Keynes was quite prescient in this regard when he wrote, "Experience accumulates to prove that most modern mass-production processes can be performed in most countries and climates with almost equal efficiency" (Keynes, 1933 , p. 238, quoted in Davidson, 2007 .
Under the more realistic assumptions that trade need not be balanced, less-than-full employment is possible, and capital and technology are mobile, trade follows absolute monetary cost advantages rather than inherent comparative efficiency advantages (see Brewer, 1985; Milberg, 1994 ). Davidson's articulation of this view is worth quoting at length:
...given the existence of multinational firms and the ease with which they can transfer technology internationally, any differences in relative costs of production in any particular industry are more likely to reflect national differences in money wages (per same hour of "real" human labor) plus the costs of providing "civilized" working conditions (measured in terms of a single currency) such as limiting the use of child labor, plus the costs to the enterprise of providing health insurance and pension benefits for employees, etc. In other words, in a laissezfaire system today, global industrial-trade patterns are more likely to reflect differences in nominal wage, occupational safety, and other nominal labor expenses that the enterprise must bear, than real costs associated with either national differences in climate, or difference [s] in the availability of natural resources. (Davidson, 2007, pp. 131-32.) Davidson concedes that traditional principles of comparative advantage continue to apply in natural resource-based products, "where productivity is related to climatic conditions or mineral availability" (p. 133). In many manufactured goods, however, production is likely to be located wherever multinational firms can obtain the lowest unit money labor costs, i.e., money wages adjusted for productivity and measured in a common currency. Therefore, international production and trade patterns will be determined by [the] absolute advantage of having a large supply of low money wage workers available and not by the law of comparative advantage. Consequently, in the West production and employment in the tradeable goods industries will decline substantially, if not completely. (Davidson, 2007, p. 136.) Davidson goes on discuss the application of these principles to various current issues, such as the controversy over "outsourcing" and displaced workers in the United States (on this point, he cites the excellent recent book by Uchitelle, 2006) . Among other things, Davidson refutes the facile notion that the United States could address the problem of displaced workers simply by supplying more education and training. If the jobs have moved elsewhere, even highly educated or retrained workers will not find employment commensurate with their skills.
Somewhat pessimistically but perhaps realistically, Davidson concludes as follows:
Unless the governments of developed nations take deliberate action to secure and maintain full employment in their domestic economies despite their lack of absolute advantage competitiveness in industries producing tradeable goods and services, free trade has the potential to impoverish a significant portion of the population.... (Davidson, 2007, p. 137.) 
What mainstream economists believe
Davidson is on less firm ground when he makes the following claim:
Every well-trained mainstream economist whose work is logically consistent with classical theory knows that the claimed benefits of free trade with a freely flexible exchange rate are:
1. that it is impossible for any nation to experience a persistent (unfavorable) trade imbalance where the value of imports exceeds that of exports; 2. that each nation can pursue monetary and fiscal policies for full employment without inflation, independent of the economic situation of its trading partners; and 3. that the flow of capital will always be from the rich creditor (i.e., developed nations to the poor debtor (i.e., less developed) nations.... capital should flow from where it [is abundant and] earns a lower return to where it [is scarce and] earns a higher return, i.e., capital should flow from rich nations into the poor nations until the return on capital is equal in each country. (Davidson, 2007, pp. 126-27.) Admittedly, Davidson puts a few key qualifiers in this statement when he refers to "well-trained" economists "whose work is logically consistent with classical theory" (thus leaving open the possibility that there are mainstream economists who are not well-trained or whose work is not consistent with classical theory) and when he refers to "claimed benefits" (thus acknowledging that mainstream economists may understand that these benefits are not being realized).
Nevertheless, I think points 1 and 3 in this list are quite out of date as a characterization of what most mainstream international economists believe, and even point 2 is no longer maintained in such a strident fashion today.
It would be more accurate to say that these three claims were believed by most mainstream economists up to the early 1970s, and that they were cited as justifications for the shift to flexible exchange rates and open capital markets at that time. However, much ink has been spilt since then on why these predictions did not come true. It would also be accurate to observe that many undergraduate textbooks continue to teach such ideas, even after they have been abandoned by serious scholars in the field (a fact that, in itself, is a sorry commentary on the current state of undergraduate economics education). The better textbooks at least specify the assumptions required for these conditions to hold (for example, #1 requires immobility of financial capital, while #3 ignores risk premia and technological differences). Most importantly-and I will return to this point below-economists should believe in some version of #1 (i.e., an automatic adjustment mechanism to maintain balanced trade) if they want to assert On the first point, mainstream open economy macro models show numerous cases in which there can be persistent trade imbalances, provided that financial capital is mobile and a nation reaches an "equilibrium" with sustainable net financial inflows or outflows. In models with mobility of financial capital, balance-of-payments equilibrium is typically defined in terms of the overall balance, not the current account or trade balance alone. In the most au courante neoclassical models, the current account is driven by the capital (or financial) account, 5 and the latter is determined by "intertemporal optimizing behavior," which entails lending by nations where saving exceeds investment (consumption is less than income) to nations where investment exceeds saving (consumption is greater than income). These models generally contain "intertemporal budget constraints," according to which net lending must be balanced by net borrowing (or net repayments) and vice-versa in the very long run. Post Keynesian economists should be critical of such models for their many unrealistic assumptions, especially in regard to super-rational agents who possess unbelievable amounts of information about the future.
Nevertheless, modern neoclassical models do allow for "persistent" surpluses or deficits on current account (and in the trade balance) for significant periods of time (on the order of decades or longer)-and in some such models, "permanent" or "equilibrium" current account imbalances are possible (see, e.g., Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008) .
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On the second point, while the general idea is still maintained, there is increasing recognition that national policy making can be significantly constrained especially if free mobility of financial capital is also allowed. Without going into the technicalities of the various models, one simple device that is commonly used in mainstream analysis is the idea of the impossible trinity or "policy trilemma": no country can simultaneously have more than two of the three goals of autonomous monetary policy, control of its exchange rate, and open financial (capital) markets. Especially, once countries have opened their financial markets, they must give up either control of their own interest rates or management of the exchange rate, and any country that tries to violate this risks a financial crisis. Of course, it is not at all clear why having liberalized financial markets should be considered a goal of economic policy on the same plane as having autonomy in regard to monetary policy and the exchange rate (see Palley, 2009 )-unless one believes in the third point, which is the alleged benefit of open capital markets (see also Blecker, 1999) . Nevertheless, the trilemma concept-along with the many more specific models that underlie it-effectively makes the point that contemporary mainstream economists do not believe that every country with free trade and a flexible exchange rate has complete policy autonomy.
What perhaps does underlie point two is the notion that flexible exchange rates function as a "shock absorber" that helps countries to mitigate the impact of external "shocks"-whether the shocks are supply-side (e.g., oil price increases), demand-side (e.g., a foreign recession), or financial (e.g., a rise in the world interest rate). In the simplest textbook models, there are situations in which adjustments of flexible exchange rates can completely offset the effects of such shocks on the real economy. But mainstream analysis has long since advanced over those simple models, and no one today would seriously claim that having a flexible exchange rate completely insulates, for example, the United States from an adverse oil price shock or Canada from a U.S. recession. Among other things, it is now widely recognized that flexible exchange rates can be driven by financial market forces (such as interest rate differentials, volatile expectations, herd behavior, and speculative bubbles) that can move them in different directions from what would be helpful for keeping trade balanced or nullifying external shocks (see the sources cited in Blecker, 1999) .
On the third point, mainstream economists are acutely aware of the fact that most global financial flows are not moving towards the poorest, most capital-scarce countries, and instead (rather "perversely") have been flowing mostly to the world's richest nation, the United States.
Even if one focuses on FDI, most of it flows among the industrialized nations and to a small number of upper-middle-income or rapidly growing nations (e.g., China and Vietnam), while relatively little goes to the broad majority of low-income nations. But rather than continue to assert a prediction that is blatantly false, mainstream economists have devoted much energy to explaining why capital is not flowing into the capital-scarce, less developed countries, and in fact there is now quite a large literature on this topic. 7 This literature includes numerous explanations that are perfectly compatible with mainstream economic reasoning, including inferior technology, complete specialization, increasing returns, institutional failings (e.g., corruption or inadequate rule of law), and a lack of complementary inputs (e.g., human capital and infrastructure). Essentially, these explanations allow for variations in some of the factors that are held constant in the ceteris paribus assumption of the traditional model, and when these factors are variable, then the poorest countries do not necessarily offer the highest expected returns to capital, their "scarcity" of capital notwithstanding.
While all these explanations have some merit, they focus on the "supply side" and ignore the "demand side" emphasized by Keynes. There are other explanations that emphasize the demand side and are therefore more consistent with Keynesian theory. For example, to the extent that FDI is directed toward sales in domestic markets, then low-income countries with small consumer markets make relatively unattractive locations for FDI. If developing countries try to attract export-oriented FDI (e.g., for low-wage assembly operations), they may be subject to a "fallacy of composition" in the simultaneous efforts of so many such countries to attract foreign capital to promote exports of similar types of goods to the same industrialized country markets (see Blecker 2002; Razmi and Blecker, 2008) . In this case, it is perfectly logical that most would-be exporters among the developing nations will not attract large amounts of FDI, even though a few of them succeed in doing so. Thus, there are Keynesian as well as neoclassical explanations for the fact that most capital does not flow toward the poorer countries.
Nevertheless, most mainstream economists today no longer believe in the simple-minded prediction that capital will always flow toward the poorer countries where it is more scarce. trade (as opposed to equilibrium in the overall balance of payments), there is an intellectual incoherency in their use of a "pure" trade theory that assumes the existence of such an automatic adjustment mechanism while their international financial models no longer imply one. In most international economics textbooks, balanced trade is assumed in the trade half, but there is no serious effort to justify this assumption in the finance half (since only the simplest models that assume capital immobility imply automatically balanced trade). with China the import-export ratio was about 5:1. 9 In the presence of such lopsided imbalances, the displaced workers whose travails are chronicled by Uchitelle (2006) did not all have their jobs sacrificed on the altar of greater efficiency; rather, many of them lost their jobs due to mismanaged exchange rates as well as macroeconomic and trade policies that do not serve the national interest.
The efficacy of exchange rate adjustment
In the course of his discussion of exchange rate adjustment, Davidson makes the following, eminently reasonable statement:
In the real world, trade between nations does not always involve the large gross substitution effects presumed by classical theory. Income effects can have major impacts on a nation's international payments balance. Sole reliance on changes in exchange rates to solve persistent trade imbalances can be misplaced even in the long run. (Davidson, 2007, p. 137, italics added.) As long as the qualifiers in italics are maintained, I have no quarrel with this statement.
Nevertheless, in parts of this discussion, Davidson appears to forget the qualifiers and implies that exchange rate changes are rarely effective (or are generally ineffective) for rectifying trade imbalances. For example, he claims that the reduction in the U.S. trade deficit in the late 1980s was caused mainly by a drop in prices of imported oil and the economic slowdown that culminated in the recession of 1991, not by the large dollar depreciation of 1985-87 (Davidson, 2007, pp. 141-43) . 10 He also asserts what used to be called "elasticity pessimism,"
i.e., the view that the Marshall-Lerner elasticities sum to about one or less, so that a depreciation of a nation's currency fails to improve its trade balance (because the increase in the quantity of exports and decrease in the quantity of imports together are insufficient to offset the increased domestic currency cost of the imports). Davidson admits that these elasticities are low mainly in the short run, and may rise over time as contemplated in the "J-curve" concept of trade balance adjustment (where the trade balance first worsens, but later improves, in response to a currency depreciation, as it takes time for companies involved in international trade to change their contracts, place or receive new orders, produce goods, and send or receive shipments). However, he then asserts that the long-run improvement may never take place, claiming that "the initial short-run J-curve worsening in the trade balance can induce expectations of a further fall in the exchange rate that might generate a new J-curve that signifies a further immediate decline in the value of net exports (Davidson, 2007, p. 140, italics added) . Of course this "can" happen, but
Davidson provides no evidence or citations to support the implication that it is a typical result.
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On the contrary, numerous studies have verified that trade balances often respond positively to currency depreciation albeit after some initial lag-especially in the industrialized countries (less so in developing nations).
To clarify where I agree and where I disagree with Davidson, the data in Figure 1 Bush's Persian Gulf War, the current account swung briefly into a surplus in that year).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The trade deficit rose slightly in 1993-95, primarily as a result of the recovery from the 1991 recession (this was an income effect on which Davidson and I would fully agree).
Subsequent to that, the rise in the dollar in the late 1990s contributed to an even larger increase in the trade deficit, again with about a two-year lag (the trade deficit accelerates after 1997, about two years after the dollar started rising in 1995-although 1997 was also the year of the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, which led to a negative foreign income effect as well as further appreciation of the dollar). As before, both exchange rate and income effects were clearly at work, but the former were certainly not negligible.
The real mystery in the data shown in Figure 1 Figure 1) caused a significant and persistent reduction in the investment rate and capital stock in the U.S.
manufacturing sector, which produces most tradable goods (see Blecker, 2007) .
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Factor (1) meant that while U.S. exports did begin to rise as a result of the lower dollarsince U.S. export compete mainly with products from other industrialized countries-imports also continued to grow, especially from developing countries whose currencies did not appreciate until after 2006. Thus, exchange rate effects were at work, but one needs to disaggregate the data by country and currency to see how they operated (and why they were so limited). Factor (2) meant that U.S. capacity to produce tradable goods was significantly diminished during the prolonged period of dollar overvaluation, which implies that the U.S.
economy no longer has the capacity to produce many of the goods that it now imports (especially the intermediate inputs that were "outsourced"). Here, Davidson would be right to say that there is a lack of "substitutability" between U.S. and foreign products, but only because domestic capacity was destroyed-and that capacity can be rebuilt, or new capacity created. If the dollar remains low for a similarly prolonged period, and especially if the dollar falls more vis-à-vis the currencies of the developing nations (as it was starting to, in 2007-8), the U.S. will restore some of its capacity to produce tradable goods (partly, though not entirely, because the cheap dollar will lure foreign companies to invest in U.S. production).
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Nothing I have said here is intended to imply that exchange rate adjustments should be 1998 -2002 -see Blecker, 2003b . These "perverse" movements in exchange rates are driven by international interest rate arbitrage and currency market speculation ("bubbles"), not by the underlying "fundamentals" of trade balances (Blecker, 1999 Davidson's (2007, p. 144) conclusion, "Keynes's general theory analysis implies there should be a better way to resolve international payments imbalances than leaving the matter to a freely flexible exchange rate market."
Nevertheless, I was surprised at one omission in Davidson's otherwise comprehensive account of Keynes's views on international economics. In his essay on "National SelfSufficiency," Keynes (1933, p. 236) famously argued: "let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible; and, above all, let finance be primarily national." This argument was partly, but only partly, motivated by a desire to enable countries to maintain autonomous macroeconomic policies to sustain full employment, as emphasized by Davidson. In addition, Keynes (1933, p. 239 ) also observed that many countries were seeking "new modes of political economy" (including what we would now call development and industrial policies) that would only be feasible if they were, to some extent, freed from the constraints imposed by Notes 1 For discussions of Robinson's views on international economics and trade policy, see Rima (1991 Rima ( , 2003 and Blecker (2005b) .
2 In conventional models of the Mundell-Fleming variety, a currency depreciation is normally expansionary. However, there are many well-known reasons (not incorporated in those models) why depreciations may be contractionary. These reasons include reductions in real wages and increases in profit mark-ups, which tend to diminish consumer demand, and the higher costs of imported producer goods (capital and intermediate goods) and of servicing foreign currencydenominated debt. One classic reference is Krugman and Taylor (1978) ; see also Razmi (2007) .
3 Since the early 2000s, rapidly growing Chinese demand for raw materials and energy products has driven up primary commodity prices globally and benefited developing nations that export these goods, while simultaneously imposing severe costs on other nations (both developed and developing) that import these commodities. However, China has amassed an enormous hoard of foreign exchange reserves in its effort to limit the appreciation of the yuan. China's foreign exchange reserves increased by more than 10 times from about 160 billion U.S. dollars in January 2000 to more than 1.6 trillion U.S. dollars in February 2008 (data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, on-line database, accessed May 24, 2008) . This is exactly the kind of "excessive" hoarding of international currency reserves that Davidson's proposed international clearing union would be charged with preventing, as discussed in the next paragraph.
8 Although few contemporary neoclassical analyses even bother to address the issue of automatic trade balance adjustment, some implicitly seem to claim that trade deficits are irrelevant because a country may (to put it crudely) have a comparative advantage in selling assets (i.e., borrowing). Implicitly, this suggests a broader conception of "trade" encompassing assets as well as goods and services (essentially, the entire balance of payments), which is superficially appealing but ignores the vital distinction between goods and services (which employ labor in their production) and financial assets (which do not). One recent model of this sort portrays the present set of global trade imbalances (U.S. deficits, Asian surpluses) as a sustainable equilibrium situation, assuming that the United States has a superior ability to "generate financial assets from real investments" (Caballero, et al., p. 358, Abstract) .
9 Based on data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data," Release of March 17, 2008, on-line at www.bea.gov. 10 The oil price explanation is particularly dubious, since petroleum and related products accounted for only about 10 percent of U.S. imports of goods (and an even smaller percentage of imports of goods and services) during the late 1980s. See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 4 .2.5, Exports and Imports of Goods and Services by Type of Product, available at www.bea.gov. The slowdown argument is more valid, as discussed below, but does not imply that the dollar depreciation had no effect. 11 The one situation in which Davidson's outcome is likely to occur is in a developing country with high import dependency, in which a currency devaluation exacerbates domestic inflation (by making imports more expensive) thereby nullifying the competitive benefits of the nominal devaluation and, often, leading to another round of devaluation. However, this outcome is rarely observed in industrialized nations (or any nations) where inflation is under control. For example, when the U.S. dollar fell in 1985-89 and again in 2002-8, we did not an outbreak of significantly higher inflation such as was observed in, for example, Mexico following the massive devaluations of 1982 and 1986 during that country's debt crisis.
12 There is already evidence that this is starting to happen. The business press is reporting significant foreign investments in U.S. production, partly as a result of the low dollar and partly in response to high transportation costs due to the rise in energy prices. See, for example Mui (2008) , who reports investments in Virginia by Ikea (in furniture) and by Rolls Royce and Canon (in high tech). The role of high energy prices in driving some production, such as steel, back to the U.S. is also discussed by Rubin and Tal (2008) .
